currently trending idea about legal content that tends to acquire-at least among analytical legal philosophers-the shell of a new minimal common ground. In its most abstract rendition the idea is that, regardless of where exactly one chooses to locate the borderline, there are many, several or select cases in judicial practice where descriptive facts about the sayings and doings of legal officials will fail to autonomously determine their own bearing on the content of the law at a given time and place.
In this brief general comment, I would like to take the liberty of flagging an issue that, albeit orthogonal to the more particular themes addressed in this collection, provides an illuminating background as to what might license the impression that disagreement between legal scholars, philosophers and linguists over the nature of legal interpretation is too shallow or "conceptual" to merit resolution as a distinct source of interdisciplinary concern. The background I am concerned with regards the answerability of theories of legal interpretation to the verdicts of metaphysical inquiry into the determinants of legal content. 4 Broadly construed, determinants of legal content are descriptive and, arguably, The present collection does not skimp on arguments that convey a committed viewpoint on this relationship. What is missing, nonetheless, is a "taxonomic primer," so to speak, that would enable the reader to decode the chapter-by-chapter succession of profoundly diverse perspectives on how competing theories of legal interpretation map onto their different metaphysical backgrounds. As I plan to show further downstream, an overarching, taxonomic perspective that would facilitate the comprehension of the interdisciplinary scope of this collection becomes available only if we ascend at a higher level of abstraction where the elementary metaphysical question of what a legal interpreter asks when she interprets the law is neither bracketed nor treated as settled. The nature of this taxonomic perspective is distinctly metaphysical in the sense that it addresses head on the question of how the epistemology of law-namely, the way in which we acquire cognitive access to the legally relevant information conveyed by various sources of legal content (textual, historical, psychological)-tracks the metaphysics of law-namely, the explanation of how facts about the enactment of texts, the history of political and interpretative practices and the communicative dimension of legislative discourse ground
The Nature of Legal Interpretation 29 the existence of more fine-grained facts about general legal obligations and rights in a given jurisdiction.
Before moving on, I should stress that I do not perceive nor purport to present the lack of this "taxonomic primer" as a weakness to which the present collection is in any sense answerable. My aim is to alert the reader to the depth of substantive metaphysical disagreement implied by this ambitious collection of doctrinal (constitutional and statutory), linguistic, historical and philosophical (analytical and hermeneutical)
perspectives on the nature of legal interpretation. Fortunately, the selection of topics addressed by each contributor contains a sufficient amount of "metaphysical cues" which I plan to "exploit" in the course of inferring the underlying pattern from which I plan to derive my metaphysical-taxonomic suggestions towards the end of this essay. What I am inclined to interpret as a metaphysically meaningful pattern that all featured essays appear to instantiate in one way or another is a recurring alternation mainly between objectual and agentive and, less frequently, effectual or impact-centered modes of describing the subject matter of legal interpretation. By "modes" I mean nothing more sophisticated than ways of talking about or expressing one's viewpoint on what a legal interpreter is supposed to ask when (s)he engages in the respective activity of interpreting the law.
As I plan to document with textual evidence, the basic question of legal interpretation can be mirrored in three interrogative variants which the reader of this collection will encounter in more or less explicit and/or distinct formulation, namely: (1) what a legal text qua abstract object or artifact legally means or designates, (2) what a legal actor (enactor, drafter etc) qua authority-bearing agent means and/or implicates by a given enactment, and, (3) which normative states of affairs (legal obligations, rights, powers) obtain as an effect of certain linguistic (and institutional) facts about the meanings of certain texts and the utterances or speech acts of certain legal officials. Bracketing variations in scope of application or emphasis, all three modes of talking about legal interpretanda are used interchangeably across this collection of essays without their authors signaling an intentional shift in their background metaphysical allegiances.
Moreover, the objectual and agentive modes are occasionally fused into a single conceptual compound such as the "communicative content of a legal text"-as opposed to the communicative content of a legislative event (utterance or speech act performed by a legislative agent). This versatility of usage, I shall argue, should be resisted when and because it suppresses the independent force of these modes of inquiry as guides for
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evaluating the scope and content of our disagreement about the nature of legal interpretation.
Examples of the objectual mode abound in this collection both in a pure form or, as I will show further below, in fusion with the agentive mode. Reasons of space prevent me from reserving for each essay a separate documentation of the frequent use of this mode of presenting the object of legal interpretation but a few evocative examples will suffice for the bigger picture I venture to draw in this comment. Leaving aside stylistic variations, the most lucid objectual references can be found in Brian Slocum's frequent talk of "the determinants of meaning of legal texts" (14), Lawrence Solan's linguistic analysis of the interpretative dilemmas that arise "when the application of a legal text is at stake" (68), Frank Ravitch's hermeneutical elaboration of how the interpretive "horizon" of a legal text is determined by "the potential time lag and cultural shifts between the drafting of laws and their application to a variety of fact scenarios" (90) and Karen Petroski's defense of fictional legal discourse as a way of prompting "judges to step back from their own personal, prereflective understandings of the significance of legal texts" (118).
As opposed to the more extensive use of objectual expressions, explicit references to the agentive nature of legal interpretation are mainly concentrated in two essays of this I am aware that the way I have framed this evasive triad of modes of presenting the object of legal interpretation seems too ad hoc or even contrived. In the remainder of this review essay I will inject some further context and premises which will dispel, I hope, For the sake of a very brief illustration and before continuing with my own taxonomic proposal, I will take the intermediate step of associating this triad of modes of interpretative inquiry with the ideas of three prominent analytical legal philosophers whose work is cited at various points in the present collection. Further downstream, I will use this brief exegetical digression as an informative background for introducing a reconstructive taxonomy that re-articulates the objectual, agentive and effectual modes of interpretative inquiry in a language that unmasks their metaphysical implications. In doing so I hope to make a plausible case as to why these modes should not be treated simply as stylistic devices for highlighting the uneven legal relevance of different aspects of linguistic meaning but as "fragments" of metaphysically competing visions of how facts make law which, in their turn, invite jurisprudentially irreconcilable accounts of legal interpretation.
Finally, I will supplement my taxonomic proposal with an illustration of how this alternative taxonomy fares better than more traditional categorizations at measuring the depth of the ongoing controversy over whether and how far normative considerations can steer the activity of legal interpretation.
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A tacitly objectualist understanding of legal interpretation can be found in Timothy Endicott's suggestion that the question of legal interpretation is the meaning of a certain kind of legally relevant object, that is, "a good interpretation depends on true
propositions that refer to the object" (Endicott 2012: 110 Compressed as it may seem, this triad of modes of presenting the subject matter of legal interpretation is not dispensable by way of even more abstract or jargon-free paraphrasing because, as I will very briefly explain, a simple "scratch" on its surface reveals three sharply distinct, underlying conceptions of the metaphysics of lawmaking actions which supply the basic materials of legal interpretation. These accounts can be respectively labeled "lawmaking as a mode of production," "lawmaking as a mode of performative expression (or achievement)" and "lawmaking as a normatively impactful activity (or process)."
The first account ("lawmaking as production") directly corresponds to the objectual mode of talking about the object of legal interpretation and is perhaps the most metaphysically demanding in the sense that it rests on a stratified approach to ontology. right true. Some of the aspects of the activities-rather than the productive or illocutionary actions-of lawmaking officials are taken to change the normative landscape in a way that generates situations that bear the pertinent truthmaking relation to certain propositional contents. Accordingly, the task of legal interpretation will be to ascertain the obtaining of such truthmaking situations.
22
The resulting division of opinion is, I would like to think, much sharper than the picture conveyed by "closer to the surface" distinctions such as the textualism/intentionalism/purposivism triad, the subjective and objective variants of communicative content or the originalism/non-originalism divide. To illustrate the ambit of this suppressed division of opinion it is worth casting a critical eye on the treatment that is commonly reserved for considerations related to the separation of powers in the context of statutory interpretation. what individuates certain facts as apt for making law appeals to competing conceptions of the division of epistemic labor among the branches cannot be conclusive. As a result, no such theory can guard itself against objections from judicial activism if it omits to make visible its metaphysical views on the nature of lawmaking actions. This is not a concern that rival theories of interpretation literally ignore but, more often than not, they suppress its urgency or direct relevance. Consequently, they appear to consent to the depiction of their arguments and counterarguments as being informed solely by a combination of linguistic and normative considerations. The Nature of Legal Interpretation 37 the essential properties of the cognitive artifacts they produce. 24 Within this metaphysical framework she is licensed to argue that lawmaking is better understood as a productive enterprise in the artifactual sense explicated above because an essential property of legal artifacts is their origin in some procedure that is minimally recognizable as a form of representative lawmaking. Accordingly, their procedural pedigree requires that they be interpreted in a way that does justice to their function as instruments for reaching finality in the resolution of immanent disagreement about what is just and permissibly enforceable in a political community. With these premises at hand it could easily follow that, barring a list of exceptional circumstances, a variant of sentence meaning might be the best candidate for determining, in most cases, the content of the legal rules composing a particular statute.
My estimation is that such incidences make visible the indispensability of frequent appeals to an interpretative theory's metaphysical commitments. The specific questions we ask in the context of a more targeted interpretative dispute can be more or less normatively loaded but it is imperative for the intelligibility of our disagreement that they be transparent to their metaphysical origins. In other words, we should be hesitant to proclaim the felicitous or infelicitous conclusion of an episode of interpretative disagreement prior to making sure that we have settled or, at least, significantly mitigated the more basic dispute regarding the type of question we ask when we engage in legal interpretation. Are we inquiring into the meaning of textual artifacts, the meaning of authoritative utterances or the truth of assertions of deontic propositions about legal obligations, rights or powers?
These questions are anything but reducible to a common "ontological" ascendant and for that reason it is advisable that they become more visible in a collective project that invites a confrontation of interdisciplinary insights from the law/language interface.
By taking on board the first question we shoulder a commitment to a stratified ontology of objects (material inscriptions, texts and laws) standing in relations of consecutive constitution to each other. 25 Accordingly, we must be ready to account for what makes it the case that an abstract entity equipped with a normative function springs into existence in virtue of representing certain texts as endowed with some specific characteristics. By taking on board the second question we shoulder a commitment to a category of reasons for action that derive their force from the performance of certain speech acts that qualify as a proper exercise of a type of practical authority. In this scenario we need to be ready to account for the rationality of guidance by a legal authority. Marmor (2014: 28-34 Whittington (1999) and Barnett (2004) .
3. By "legal considerations" I mean to refer to the more specific considerations emanating from the values associated with the idea of the rule of law.
4. Mark Greenberg voices the same concern when he notes that "because legal interpretation seeks to ascertain the content of the law, a method of legal interpretation is correct if it accurately identifies the legal facts. Given this point, it is but a short step to recognize that the correct method of legal interpretation depends on how the content of the law is determined. As noted above, legal facts are high-level facts, which obtain in virtue of more basic facts. In general, in such high-level domains, the correct method of ascertaining the high-level facts will depend on how the more fundamental facts make it the case that the high-level facts obtain" (Greenberg 2017: 110-11) . Whereas I do concur with Greenberg that a theory of legal interpretation must carry its metaphysical commitments "on its sleeve," I do not agree that everyone else should or would agree that the question of legal interpretation is the ascertainment of the truth of normative propositions about the obtaining of legal obligations and rights. As I will try to show in the remainder of this note, not all legal philosophers tie their theories of legal interpretation so closely to the identification of robust normative states of affairs.
5. It bears noting that Solum's hybrid variant of original meaning as both objectual and agentive rests on a further distinction between the communicative, original meaning or content of a constitutional text that judges recover by means of interpretation in the strict, descriptive sense and the legal effect or content of the same text as the latter is
The Nature of Legal Interpretation 39 derived by engaging in the normative, creative process of constitutional construction (142). The original meaning of a constitutional text is eo ipso constitutive of its legal content only when and because the originalist principle of constraint ought to be applied to a particular case.
6. The reason I am inclined to take the infrequency of this mode to be unsurprising is two-fold. First, to this day, the most metaphysically concise as well as jurisprudentially distinct account of legal interpretation as the activity of discovering the normative effect or impact of linguistic and other social facts is owed to the still developing research of a single analytical legal philosopher. Mark Greenberg's "Moral Impact Theory of Law" remains the basic source of reference for treating this mode of talking about the nature of legal interpretation as a distinct variant. That being said, there is room for arguing that the normative impact of linguistic facts is not conceptually distant from the more traditional purposivist and pragmatist elaboration of the "perlocutionary effect" of legislative utterances, namely, the change in the law that a legislature intends to achieve by enacting a given statute. I remain timid to stretch this correlation beyond the surface similarity between impact and effect mainly because Greenberg's theory is committedly normative and metaphysically realist, whereas standard appeals to the purposive nature of legal interpretation terminate at the descriptive claim that the inference of the ratio legis or purpose of an enactment is ultimately based on descriptive facts about the actual or counterfactual perlocutionary-as opposed to the illocutionary or communicative-intentions of lawmaking officials. 7. For Mark Greenberg's specification of the effectual or impact-centered approach to legal interpretation see infra note 20. interpretation. Yet sometimes, gaining an understanding requires a creative intellectual process of finding reasons for an answer to a question (which might have been answered differently) as to the meaning of the object [emphasis added]. Some understanding does not require that process. The distinction is well signaled by using the term 'interpretation' for that process" (Endicott 2012: 121) . 11. Greenberg notes that his formulation of the basic question of legal interpretation dispenses with conflating the ascertainment of the linguistic meaning of certain sources of legal content (statutes, constitutions, etc.) with the ascertainment of the contribution that these sources make to the content of the law. In his words, "the term 'legal interpretation' is often used in a way that is ambiguous between ascertaining the meaning of legal texts and using the relevant texts to ascertain what the law is.
Theorists often slip back and forth between these two usages. For example, it is ubiquitous in discussions of constitutional interpretation to talk about 'the meaning' of the Constitution or of a constitutional provision. It is often left unclear whether the question is the meaning of the words of the provision or the provision's contribution to the content of the law" (Greenberg 2017 , supra note 4, at 107). In a somewhat similar spirit but from a different jurisprudential viewpoint, Lawrence Solum alerts us to the importance of distinguishing the interpretative process of recovering the linguistic meaning of certain legal texts from the constructive process of identifying the legal effect (or legal content) of these texts (see Solum 2010) . I do not intend to challenge the cogency of these distinctions with which I generally concur. I do, however, believe that they fall short of "hitting" their main target, namely, to render void the license to make direct appeals to the "legal meaning" of texts or authoritative utterances. In other words, I believe that it remains permissible for a legal theorist to argue that what she takes the legal contribution, legal effect or legal content of a certain text or utterance to be just is the meaning of a certain object construed as a cognitive artifact or the meaning of an utterance endowed with the performative force of a legal directive or declaration. In other words, nothing in principle and in advance of further metaphysical argument, prevents someone from denying that the content of the law is the normative content of certain free-standing, publicly assertible, deontic propositions whose truthmakers are not descriptive facts about the existence of legislative artifacts or the performative force of legislative utterances but those states
The Nature of Legal Interpretation 41 of affairs that obtain as an effect of their existence or force. On pain of stumbling on the Humean is/ought gap objection, the truthmakers of such normative propositions must also be normative. Accordingly, invoking the centrality to legal interpretation of these normative propositions for the sake of closing the gap between the purported normativity of legal facts and the social practices on which the latter rest is a move that can be resisted as question-begging. for centuries, as a remembrance, even though the cloth of the flag is badly damaged and without any value" (Ingarden 1989: 260) . In a similar vein, Amie Thomasson
suggests that "what seems most basic in many cases is the intention that the creation be subject to certain norms, in the sense that it be recognizable as something that is to be treated, used, or regarded, in some ways rather than others…It is the intended normative features (that the object be subject to certain norms) that drive the intended recognitional features…as well as many intended structural features" (Thomasson 2014 : 51-52).
13. Norman (1991: 17) . For a taxonomy of human-made, physical or abstract objects that functionally contribute to performing a cognitive task (cognitive artifacts), see Heersmink (2013) . Crucially, Heersmink includes in his taxonomy nonrepresentational artifacts which "contain information-structures as [rather than about] the world (i.e., ecological information)" (ibid., 472).
14. Alternative modes of representation include icons which are pictorially isomorphic to what they represent (e.g., a map or a graph) and indices which causally interact with the object they represent (e.g., a thermometer or a compass). See Heersmink (2013: 473-74).
15. Kenneth Ehrenberg's artifactual theory of law provides a lucid example of an objectualist approach to the determinants of legal content as it is premised on the hypothesis that " [l] aws are artifacts in that they are specialized creations of human intentionality that serve specific purposes and are designed in order to be recognized as such" (Ehrenberg 2016: 175) .
16. For the importance of registering the distinction between the agential and productive aspect of mental states and speech acts, see Moltmann (2013) .
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17. Subjective theories of communicative content take actual mental states to be the constitutive determinants of speaker meaning. See, e.g., Grice (1989) , Schiffer (1972) , Neale (2005) , and Bach (2006) .
18. Objective theories hold that the content that a speaker counts as having communicated is determined by the inferences that a rational hearer, knowing the context and conversational background, would be warranted in making about the speaker's communicative intentions. See, e.g., Goldsworthy (2005) , Soames (2011), and Marmor (2013) .
19. Joseph Raz's Sources Thesis is a refined specification of the ontological priority of enactments to the artifacts they "produce." The Sources Thesis regards both the existence of laws as well as the determination of their content. It is the former existential issue that regards the creation of sources of legal content through the performance of authoritative directives. In Raz's words, "A, being an agent who has legal authority to make a law that p, legislates (i.e., makes it the law) that p (where p is a variable for the statement of the content of the law) by performing an action which expresses the intention that p become the law in virtue of that intention being manifestly expressed" (Raz 2009: 283) . Greenberg, making the law have or bear a certain content just is to make a legal proposition-and its accompanying assertion-true in a given context. For the most recent elaboration of his theory, see Greenberg (2014) .
21. The choice of the speech act of assertion-rather than of a cognitive artifact or mental state-as the primary vehicle of legal content is anything but random. Precisely because assertion is a speech act that is commonly taken to be governed by the norm of knowledge ("one may assert that p only if one knows that p"), the assertibility of certain propositions of law is directly linked to the activity of legal interpretation, namely, the epistemic task of acquiring knowledge of what the law requires. For a general account of the epistemological background of assertion, see Goldberg (2015) .
22. I believe that the prospect of this approach hinges, to a great extent, on the prospect of the recently booming metaphysical and semantic project of truthmakers. Leaving important nuances aside, the metaphysical component of this project is identified by the claim that truth-bearers-that is, representational entities that most theorists associate with propositions-bear a certain kind of relation of metaphysical (noncausal) dependence to truthmakers-that is, a certain type of worldly entity whose identity is often associated with facts or, alternatively, states of affairs. For a seminal defense of this component, see Armstrong (2004) . The semantic component of the same project (truthmaker semantics) adds the further claim that representational contents are individuated by those facts (or states of affairs) that make these contents true. There are two principal accounts of truthmaker semantics, one developed by Yablo (2014) and Yablo (n.d.) . The other account has been developed by Kit Fine in a series of papers; see, particularly, Fine (2017a) and (2017b) .
23. For an overview of the interpretative relevance of these institutional considerations, see Nourse (2011). 24. Although some abstract artifacts have temporal or locational properties such as time of creation or jurisdictional scope (in the case of laws), abstract artifacts lack spatiotemporal location but at the same time they do not partake in the eternal, unalterable, modally robust entities inhabiting the Platonic universe, so to speak. In this regard, they occupy middle ground with respect to both real, spatiotemporally individuated and ideal, timeless entities. On this mode of classification, see Thomasson (2003: 139-40) .
25. In defending his artifactual theory of law, Ehrenberg aptly remarks that the relation of statutory artifacts to texts is not identity but rather constitution. He notes, "[l]aws and legal systems are certainly abstract institutions in that they are not identical with the people constituting the legal officials, the words written in books or scrolls of law [emphasis added], or the geographic area of their jurisdiction" (Ehrenberg 2016 , supra note 15, at 170).
